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Abstract
A major perspective in explaining involuntary unemployment is to recognize the
existence of job market frictions, in particular, job market matching frictions. The
workhorse model employed is the Diamond- Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model.
Similar to the labor market, the market for physical capital markets exhibits the
same characteristics with a pool of unsold inventory as well as used capital that
is sold and reallocated to other firms. Nevertheless, past research has highlighted
several issues of the DMP model in matching the characteristics of the labor mar-
ket. In a model enriched with labor participation flows and job separation, I
evaluate the model performance in resolving the issues in the Krause and Lubik
(2007) model in the presence of nominal price rigidity. The model resolves the
failure in generating the Beveridge curve in the presence of endogenous job de-
struction. Separately, in a RBC model with frictional labor and physical capital
market and endogenous labor participation, I evaluate the model prediction in a
context where labor disutility is procyclical under both contemporaneous shocks
and news shocks.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous job separation and
labor participation rate
1.1 Abstract
In this paper, I worked with a New Keynesian model that features endogenous
job separations, labor force participation and worker turn-over costs. The model-
ing of endogenous separations that is based on a reservation productivity acting
on a continuous match productivity distribution is in the tradition of denHaan
(2000) and Walsh (2005). The modeling of endogenous labor participation is in
the spirit of Gali (2011). Yet, these models have inherent performance issues.
The objective of this research is to evaluate the performance of a model that in-
corporates the coexistence of these labor flows that have often been ignored in
macro-economic models and at the same accounting for the costs of hiring and
job separations. Labor turnover costs have been well documented in empirical
literature (see Sakellaris (2000)). However, most models have chosen to focus only
on search costs and to a lesser extent, separation costs while ignoring training
and adaptation costs. The model that is developed here incorporates these de-
tails and is evaluated on its ability to match the moments of the US economy,
in the context of the issues highlighted in Krause and Lubik (2007) for the basic
endogenous separation model. The basic endogenous separation model shows a)
a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, b) a positive corre-
lation between job creation rate and job destruction rate, c) a high volatility in
the job creation rate and d) a negative correlation between output and inflation
1
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rate. These characteristics are counter-factual to the empirical behavior of the US
economy.
In a model featuring both endogenous labor participation rate and nominal wage
rigidity through staggered wage negotiaton in the Calvo spirit, Gali (2011) is able
to demonstrate results that are in line with the cyclical properties of unemploy-
ment and labor force participation and employment volatility. This was achieved
however with the calibration of labor bargaining share that is outside the range of
empirical evidence.
A novel approach in the model developed in this chapter relates to the detailing
of worker replacement costs. The incorporation of the different components of
worker turnover costs by including training and adaptation costs, in addition to
search costs and job separation costs, adds a new dimension to the model that has
not been explored in the literature.
The model in this paper shows several improvements in performance achieving the
negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, between job creation
rate and job destruction and reducing the high volatility in the job creation rate.
The behavior of labor force participation rate is also relatively in line with the
empirical data. The issue of the negative correlation between inflation and output
remains unresolved and arises from the model’s behavior to technology shocks.
1.2 Introduction
In recent literature, researchers modeling the labor market typically employed
DSGE models that are augmented with match frictions in the mode of the Dia-
mond. Mortensen and Pissarides model, that feature labor flows between employ-
ment and unemployment but with the assumption of a constant exogenous separa-
tion rate. The assumption of a constant separation rate is motivated by research
findings that concluded that variations in the job creation rate is the dominant
contributing factor to unemployment in postwar US data. Shimer (2005) found,
by comparing the unemployment series derived from a constant job separation
rate, using calculations following the methodology of Pissarides (1996), with the
actual unemployment series of postwar US, that there is no significant difference
between the two series. On the other hand, when a constant job finding is imposed,
the computed series is significantly different from the actual unemployment series.
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Hall (2005) arrives at the same conclusion by comparing the volatiliy rates of the
inflow and outflow rates for unemployment that the US unemployment is driven
mainly by variations in the job finding rate. Since then, a constant separation rate
is often assumed in DSGE models. However, Pissarides (2007) argued that despite
the lower volatility of the separation rate, the correlation between the inflow and
outflow rate is significant. Furthermore, in subsequent research findings, the re-
spective contributions of the inflow and outflow rate are estimated to be at 30:70
in researches by Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2007), Braun, De Bock and DeCecio
(2006) as well as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
As reported in Gali (2011), conditional on monetary and demand shocks, the
participation rate has a correlation of 0.2 with output although the correlation with
output is acyclical (0.02) conditional on technology shocks. The latter together
with the low volatility results in its movement being ignored in most models.
This is however disputed in recent papers on labor participation. Nucci and Riggi
(2014) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014) highlighted that the effect of labor
participation cannot be ignored in the study of monetary policies. The endogenous
flow of labor in and out of labor force has also become a focus in current research
partly because of its behavior in the latest recession. Erceg and Levin (2013),
Christiano et al (2014) are examples. Making labor participation endogenous
however, introduces additional difficulty to the model because wealth effect and
reduced job separation rate affects the incentive for unemployed workers to search
for a job in countervailing directions.
This paper integrates endogenous labor participation rate into a model of endoge-
nous labor separation in the tradition of denHaan et al (2000), Krause and Lubik
(2007) and Walsh et al (2005). The model has been extended by Zanetti (2011)
to evaluate the effects of labor institutions endogenous separations. The extended
form with unemployment insurance is used in Albertini and Fairise (2013) and
Ahrens, Nejati and Pfeiffer (2014). I choose to use a variant of the model in using
productivity dependent firing taxes in the spirit of Wesselbaum (2007). In this
paper, I extended the model with endogenous labor participation along the line of
Gali (2011) and investigated the performance of the model with endogenous labor
participation in coexistence with endogenous separations and its fit with empirical
data using calibrations from the literature in real wage rigidity and firing taxes.
As demonstrated by Gali (2011) and Blanchard and Gali (2010), wage rigidity is
needed in their model to create volatility in their model. In particular the Gali
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(2011) model employs nominal wage rigidity that arises from staggered bargain-
ing in the spirit of Calvo staggered pricing while Blanchard and Gali (2011) used
real wage rigidity induced from a wage norm. I chose the latter approach as a
simplifying approach so as to focus on the other aspects of the model instead of
the details of the wage negotiation mechanisms. The same approach is also used
in Albertini and Fairise (2013).
One particular aspect of this paper is to highlight the adaptation and training
costs involved in a labor match formation. Matching costs in the form of fixed
sunk in cost have been demonstrated in two papers by Silva and Toledo (2009)
and (2011) and discussed in Pissarides (2009) and Nagypal and Mortensen (2009)
as one mechanism in the partial resolution of the volatility puzzle highlighted in
Shimer (2005). Empirical studies by Sakellaris (2000) and Barron et al (1999)
on adjustment costs highlight that substantial training and adaptation costs are
incurred in the first quarter of a newly hired worker. In labor matching models,
these costs, in addition to direct search costs, affect the volatility of the matching
rate.
1.3 Literature
This section summarizes the cyclical properties of employment, labor force, un-
employment, vacancies and job creation and destruction rate from the literature
and the performance related issue highlighted in the endogenous separation model.
A summary of the postwar US labor market statistics is provided in Table 1 as
reported from Krause and Lubik (2007) augmented with labor force participation
rate from Gali (2011).
As highlighted in Krause and Lubik (2007), there are several issues in the per-
formance of the basic endogenous separation model related to the models used
in denHaan (2000), Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2007). The issues are a) positive
correlation between unemployment rate and vacancies b) positive correlation be-
tween job creation and job destruction c) negative correlation between output and
inflation d) high job creation rate and job destruction rate volatilities. The in-
corporation of a fully rigid wage rate in the model is shown to be able to address
only the issue of the Beveridge curve while accentuating the negative correlation
between output and inflation.
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Table 1.1: Unconditional Mo-
ments for US Economy 1964- 2002
Standard Deviations
Output (1.62)
Inflation 1.11
Real Wage 0.69
Unemployment 6.9
Vacancy 8.27
Tightness 14.96
Job Creation Rate 2.55
Job Destruction Rate 3.73
Labor Participation 0.3
Correlations
U,V -0.96
JCR, JDR -0.36
Labor Force, Y 0.2
Y,Inflation 0.39
* The standard deviations for all
variables except output is relative
to the standard deviations for out-
put.
However researchers, who are involved in the study of labor institutions and unem-
ployment insurance programs, have to address the issue of endogenous separation
of labor. To confront the issues highlighted by Krause and Lubik (2007), they
have to make extensions to the endogenous separation model to match the em-
pirical behavior of the labor market. Some of the works that have attempted to
address the issues in extensions of the basic Krause and Lubik model are Wessel-
baum (2007), Ahrens, Nejati and Pfeiffer (2014), Albertini and Fairise (2013) and
Zanetti (2011) with varying degrees of success. The last applies to UK data where
the characteristics of the idiosyncratic match productivities are different from the
US. Wesselbaum (2007) extended the model with productivity dependent firing
cost while maintaining flexible wages and found that the Beveridge curve could
not be obtained under any reasonable firing tax calibrations. Albertini and Fairise
(2013) and Ahrens, Nejati and Pfeiffer (2014) made extensions that involved a
firing tax scheme that sponsors the unemployment insurance and studied the de-
sign and impact of the firing schemes. Albertini and Fairise (2013)’s version is a
RBC model and also features real wage rigidity while Ahrens, Nejati and Pfeiffer
(2014) worked with only monetary shocks. The last paper attempts to account
for the empirical results using the experience rating scheme behind the firing tax
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and unemployment insurance program in the US. The formulation involves a firing
tax scheme that increases with the duration of unemployment which essentially is
dependent on the job finding rate.
1.4 Model
The base model used in my work is an extension of the model in Krause and
Lubik (2007), and Zanetti (2011). The model is a New Keynesian model featuring
price stickiness, labor matching frictions and endogenous separations. I extend
the model with endogenous labor participation modified from from Gali (2011).
Additionally, while Krause and Lubik (2007) uses a Rotemberg pricing friction in a
single sector, I followed Walsh (2005) and Zanetti (2011) in applying the modeling
approach of separating the pricing frictions and labor frictions into a two sector
production economy. The additioanl elements in the model are a)the inclusion
of labor training and adaptation costs in the formation of labor matches and b)
external habit formation and monetary policy inertia. In the following subsections,
I describe a) the representative household, b) the intermediate goods sector with
the labor market frictions, c) the final good sector with nominal pricing frictions
and d) the monetary authority.
1.4.1 Representative Household
Each household is characterized by a continuum of members belonging to a unit
interval. Following Merz (1996), I assume that there is complete consumption
insurance within the representative household. Each member of the household
consume the same amount regardless of his employment status and income. The
household then maximizes a discrete time lifetime utility function as follows:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Ct, Nt, U
o
t
)
(1.1)
subject to a period budgetary constraint of
PtCt +QtBt ≤ Bt−1 + (1− δt)Nt−1PtW¯t +MtPtW nt − Tt + Profitst (1.2)
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where β is the time discount factor and 0 < β < 1. Ct is the quantity consumed
of an index of the different types of final goods produced by the monopolistic
retailers(j) on the unit interval such that
Ct =
{∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
1− 1
γ dj
} γ
γ−1
where γ is the elasticity of substitution between the final goods. Each period, the
household allocates the income from various sources to consumption and savings
in bonds, Bt purchased at the price of Qt.
As in Walsh (2005), Gali (2011) and numerous research work in the literature, I
have chosen to abstract away the accumulation of capital to focus on the labor
market mechanisms. The first source of income is (1 − δt)Nt−1PtW¯t which is the
real wage earned by (1− δt)Nt−1 members of the household who are employed in
the last period and are not separated this period. Nt represents the number of
household members employed for the period, t and its transition is described in
equation (1.9). δt is the total separation rate in the period and W¯t is the average
wage rate for the period. New job matches, Mt, earn W
n
t in the period. A second
source of income is the profits in the form of dividends from the firms that the
household owns fully. The government imposes a lump sum tax/transfer Tt. The
redemption of last period’s bond constitutes the final source of income.
The household members incur disutility from participating in the labor market
which consists of disutility from working νn(Nt) and as well as from search, νu(U
o
t ).
The disutility functions are define as follows:
νn(Nt) =
χnN
1+φn
t
1 + φn
νu(U
o
t ) =
χu(U
o
t )
1+φu
1 + φu
In the above utility functions, Nt and U
o
t denote respectively the fraction of house-
hold members engaged in employment and the fraction allocated to participate in
the search market at the beginning of the period. Non-participation incurs zero
disutility. The total labor force participation Ft is given by
Ft = Ut +Nt (1.3)
In equation (1.3), Ut represents the end of period unemployment.
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The household’s per period utility function is assumed to take the following form
with external habit formation:
U(Ct, Nt, U
o
t ) = log
(
Ct − hCAt−1
)− νn(Nt)− νu(U ot ) (1.4)
In equation (2.6), the external habit stock is CAt−1. I defined it to be equivalent
to last period’s aggregate consumption, Ct−1 (in level only) and the household’s
optimal decision does not involve the decision with regards to the habit stock. h
is the index of habit formation.
1.4.2 Production Sector
The production sector consists of two sectors, a monopolistic final good retail
sector and a perfect competition intermediate goods sector. The final goods pro-
ducers purchase intermediates, “differentiate” the goods and sell the final goods to
the households at differentiated pricing. Pricing frictions is localized in the final
goods retail sector. The perfect competition intermediate goods sector takes the
price of intermediates as given and produces a homogeneous intermediate good
with labor as the input. As all intermediate good firms are symmetric, I use a
representative firm. The modeling strategy of the two sector production is along
the line of work by Walsh (2005) so that we can separate the analysis of the labor
market frictions from the pricing frictions by localizing the pricing frictions in the
final goods retail sector and the labor market frictions in the intermediate goods
production sector. I first describe the intermediate goods sector and the labor
market frictions.
Intermediate Goods Sector The intermediate goods sector consists of com-
petitive firms taking price, P it as given. Each firm owns a continuum of job
matches. Each job match (indexed by i) consists of one worker and is characterized
by an idiosyncratic match productivity, Zt(i). The firm draws the idiosyncratic
productivities for its job matches every period which corresponds to one quarter.
This follows the standard approach used in Krause and Lubik (2007), denHaan
(2000) and Walsh (2005). Empirically, this is in line with the evidence on the per-
sistence of match idiosyncratic productivity shocks (see Fujita and Ramey (2012)).
The match productivity, Zt(i) is i.i.d. and is drawn from a constant distribution
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G(Z). The job matches are also affected by an aggregate technology shock At,
which affects all matches equally and follows an autoregressive process:
log(At) = ρa log(At−1) + ea,t (1.5)
where ea,t is i.i.d. normal across periods. The output function of a job match is
then AtZt(i). Because each job is characterized by Zt, we drop the index i and
identify the job match by its match productivity Zt.
1.4.2.1 Hiring and Job Separations
As in Gali (2011), hiring takes place at the beginning of the period. With contem-
poraneous hiring, the model takes into account transitions from unemployment
into employment within the period which one period ahead hiring models cannot
account for. Search models typically increase the unemployment pool to include
marginally attached workers to account for flows from non-participation into em-
ployment - see Krause and Lubik(2007) as an example).
As is standard in DMP matching models, hiring is subject to a matching function
in the form of a Cobb Douglas production function with vacancy postings, Vt and
U ot , the unemployed members of the households who are allocated to the search
market at the beginning of the period, as inputs so that the matching function is
characterized by both a constant return to scale and and concavity to each input.
The matching function used is as follows:
Mt = m (U
o
t )
µ (V ot )
1−µ (1.6)
In the above equation, m denotes the efficiency of the matching function and µ
denotes the elasticity of hiring to unemployment and 0 < µ < 1. The matching
function then gives the following identities. When the market tightness is θt which
is defined as Vt
Uot
the firm faces a worker finding probability, q(θt) while the worker
faces a job finding probability of f(θt). The identities are as follows:
q(θt) = m (θt)
−µ (1.7a)
f(θt) = m (θt)
1−µ (1.7b)
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Additionally, the relationship between the end of period unemployed workers, Ut
and beginning of period unemployed workers U ot is given as follows:
U ot =
1
1− f(θt)Ut (1.8)
In our model, hiring and job separations take place after both aggregate produc-
tivity and match productivities are observed. Job separations comprise of two
forms, an exogenous separation rate of δ and an endogenous separation rate de-
termined by the reservation idiosyncratic productivity, Zt. As in Zanetti (2011)
which follows Thomas (2008) and Mortensen and Pisarrides (2000), newly formed
job matches are not subject to separation in the first period of their formation. All
job matches from the last period i.e. t−1 which draws a match productivity below
the reservation productivity, Zt are destroyed prior to production and therefore
the endogenous separation rate of these job matches is given by δx,t = G(Zt). It
follows that the transition for employment Nt is as follows:
Nt = (1− δ)(1−G(Zt))Nt−1 + q(θt)Vt (1.9)
1.4.2.2 Intermediate Firm’s Optimal Behavior
The production function of the representative firm is determined by the number
of job matches from the last period that are not separated given the idiosyncratic
productivities drawn in the current period, the aggregate productivity shock At
and the new matches formed in the period with the starting productivity, Znt .
This is given by
Xt = AtNt−1(1− δ)(1−G(Zt))Z¯t + Atq(θt)VtZnt (1.10)
In equation (1.10), Xt is the output of the representative firm. Z¯t is the average
productivity of the job matches conditional on the idiosyncratic productivity being
above the cut off productivity, Zt i.e. jobs that have survived into production. It
is given by:
Z¯t =
∫∞
Zt
ZdG(Z)
1−G(Zt)
The last term in equation (1.10) defines the contribution from the new matches
with starting productivity Znt
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The firm’s optimization problem for each period consists of choosing the reser-
vation productivity Zt and vacancy postings, Vt in order to hire the necessary
workers, Nt to maximize the present discounted value of the real profit stream.
The firm takes as given the price of the intermediate good, P It and the labor mar-
ket tightness, θt. The expected present discounted value of the real profit stream
is given by
Et
∞∑
k=0
Λt+k|t{
P it+k
Pt+k
Xt+k −Nt+k−1(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+k))W¯t+k−
W nt+kq(θt+k)Vt+k −HCt+k −Nt+k−1(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+k))Φ(Zt+k)}
(1.11)
In equation (1.11), the firm optimizes the expected profit stream which is dis-
counted by the stochastic discount factor, Λt+k|t = βkU ′(Ct+k)/U ′(Ct). The first
three items within the parenthesis are respectively the real revenue and total real
wage paid to the workers which consist of both the “old” unseparated workers
and new hires. The hiring cost, HCt+k for the period is incurred by posting Vt
vacancies at a vacancy posting cost of c per vacancy posting and a training and
adaptation cost for each new hire such that it is given as follows:
HCt = cVt + q(θt)VtHnAt
P it
Pt
Znt (1.12)
where Hn is the proportion of revenue lost for the new matches. The average real
wages paid to the workers is given by the average real wage rate paid to surviving
job matches:
W¯t =
∫∞
Zt
Wt(Z)dG(Z)
1−G(Zt)
(1.13)
The last term consists of a firing cost. The firing cost for the destruction of a job
match is TZt. It follows that Φ(Zt) is a function of the reservation productivity
and is given by:
Φ(Zt) =
T
∫ Zt
0
ZdG(Z)
1−G(Zt)
(1.14)
This formulation of firing cost which is dependent on productivity of the separated
matches follows the formulation from Wesselbaum (2009) as opposed to Zanetti
(2011)’s formulation of fixed firing cost. As put forward in Wesselbaum(2009), the
firing cost presented as such is increasing in match productivity. As opposed to a
constant firing cost, this is more realistic and is a simple representation of wage
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dependent firing cost. Take for example Campolmi and Faia (2011) which includes
a wage based firing cost and Ahrens, Nejati and Pfeiffer (2014) which analyses
unemployment insurance that is financed through a firing cost with dependencies
on the wage rate and an expected unemployment duration. In that paper, they
also included a benchmark model with a productivity dependent firing cost of a
version of Zanetti (2011).
The opimization of equation (1.11) is subject to the employment transition equa-
tion (1.9). With ξt as the Lagrangian multiplier on equation (1.9) and using the
identities (1.10) and (1.13), the first order conditions with respect to Nt and Vt
are as follows:
ξt = Et
[
Λt+1|t(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+1)){
P it+1
Pt+1
At+1Z¯t+1 − W¯t+1 − Φ(Zt+1) + ξt+1}
]
(1.15)
c
q(θt)
+Hn
P it
Pt
AtZ
n
t =
P it
Pt
AtZ
n
t −W nt + ξt (1.16)
Equation (1.16) is the break even condition for a hiring such that the cost of a
hiring is equated to the expected marginal value of a new worker which consists of
the first period return of a job match minus the wage and the expected discounted
value of the job match in the second period subjected to job destruction and the
expected separation cost should the job be destroyed using the definition of ξt in
Equation (1.15).
The first order condition in selecting the reservation idiosyncratic productivity Zt
results in the following equation:
P it
Pt
AtZt −Wt(Zt) + ξt = −TZt (1.17)
In equation (1.17), the value of the job to be destroyed is negative because of
firing costs. As long as the job value is greater than the cost of layoff, it will be
kept. Taking into consideration the job creation equations (1.16) and (1.15), the
job destruction condition can be expressed as:
P it
Pt
At{Znt − Zt} −W nt +Wt(Zt)− TZt =
c
q(θt)
+Hn
P it
Pt
AtZ
n
t (1.18)
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1.4.3 Household Intertemporal Savings
The representative household optimizes equation (2.1) with the budget constraint
of (2.2). The intertemporal optimality condition with respect to consumption and
bonds savings are as follows:
Qt = Etβ
Ct − CAt−1
Ct+1 − CAt
Pt
Pt+1
(1.19)
The real stochastic discount at time t that is applied on the future revenue at time
t+k, Λt+k|t is given by βk
Ct−hCAt−1
Ct+k−hCAt+k−1
. Equivalently, the price of bond is related
to the nominal interest rate, it, which the monetary authority targets as a policy
tool is given by:
Qt =
1
1 + it
(1.20)
1.4.4 Labor Force Participation
The value of non-participation of a household member to the household is nor-
malized to 0 with no disutility incurred. For an interior solution, the household is
indifferent between sending the marginal member to participate in the job search
and not sending him. The value of a newly matched worker to the household is
defined as follows:
V nt = W
n
t − χnNφnt /U ′(Ct) + EtΛt+1|t(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+1))V et+1 (1.21)
In equation (1.21), V et is the average value of a marginal employed worker to the
household who has been working for more than one period and is given by
V et = W¯t − χnNφnt /U ′(Ct) + EtΛt+1|t(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+1))V et+1 (1.22)
In the above equations, the new (existing average) worker obtains a wage W nt
(W¯t) while working and the household incurs a disutility of χnN
φn
t /U
′(Ct) for
each marginal worker, expressed in consumption good. The job match is subject
to both endogenous and exogenous destruction in the beginning of the next period
and this is reflected in the future expected average value.
When a member of household is searching in the labor market, the houseold incurs
a marginal disutility of χu(U
o
t )
φu and gets compensated with the probability of
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getting matched successfully to a job. The job search process takes place at the
beginning of the period and the successful job match is rewarded with V nt . The
optimality condition with respect to U ot for the interior condition is given by:
χu(U
o
t )
φu/U ′(Ct) = f(θt)V nt (1.23)
1.4.5 Wage Setting
I consider the flexible wage scheme first. The wage setting follows a typical Nash
bargain set up that is often used in the literature. The value of a matched job of
idiosyncratic productivity Zt to a firm is given by:
J(Zt) =
P it
Pt
AtZt −W (Zt)+
Et
[
Λt+1|t(1− δ){
∫ ∞
Zt+1
J(Z)dG(Z)− (1−G(Zt+1))Φ(Zt+1)}
] (1.24)
The value of a vacancy, V firmt , is driven to 0 with free entry such that V
firm
t does
not feature in the firm’s match surplus.
At the reservation productivity, J(Zt) = −TZt. It is easy to check that equation
(1.24) is consistent with (1.17). V e(Zt), the value of a job match of productivity
Zt to the household is given by:
V e(Zt) = W (Zt)− χnNφnt /U ′(Ct) + EtΛt+1|t(1− δ)(1−G(Zt+1))V et+1 (1.25)
Under a flexible Nash bargaining scheme, workers and the representative firm
bargain over the match surplus by maximizing the Nash product of the surpluses
such that:
W ft (Zt) = argmax
W (Zt)
(J(Zt) + TZt)
1−ηV e(Zt)η (1.26)
In equation (1.26), the threat point for the firm is −TZt and I use η as a parameter
for the worker’s bargaining strength. As in the above, we respected the Bonding
critique that part of the firing cost can be passed from the firm to the worker in
the wage bargaining process. The wage for a job with idiosyncratic shock of Zt is
then given by:
W ft (Zt) = η{
P it
Pt
AtZt + TZt − EtΛt+1|t(1− δ)T}+ (1− η)χnNφnt /U ′(Ct) (1.27)
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As opposed to the existing job matches, a new job match does not separate im-
mediately and therefore do not feature firing cost in the Nash bargaining set up.
The flexible wage for the new worker, W nft is given by
W nft = η{
P it
Pt
AtZ
n
t − EtΛt+1|t(1− δ)T}+ (1− η)χnNφnt /U ′(Ct) (1.28)
The flexible real wage rates in equation (1.27) and (1.28) are obtained with the
calibration of the mean of Zt is 1 (approximately). We note that the flexible wage
rate is highly correlated to the aggregate productivity shock, At. In response
to the Shimer (2005) critique that the standard flexible wage model with search
frictions cannot replicate the volatility in the labor market, several papers have
adopted various approaches of introducing wage rigidity (see Gali (2011) and Hall
and Milgrom (2010) for example). In this paper, I use a simple rigid wage setting
approach by introducing a degree of real wage rigidity following Blanchard and
Gali (2011). Wage rigidity is incorporated by means of a wage norm W as follows:
Wt(Zt) = wW + (1− w)W ft (1.29)
In Equation (1.29), the use of wage rigidity through a social wage norm W , is
justified, according to Hall (2005) as a social consensus in selecting the equilibrium
wage in a bargaining set with w representing the degree of real wage rigidity such
that 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. As opposed to Hall (2005), which assumes that the wage norm is
based on the immediate past quarter of wage, I use a norm that is sufficiently long
looking backwards such that W is the wage rate paid on the long run expected
aggregate productivity At and Z¯t.
1.4.6 Retail Sector and Pricing Friction
There is a continuum of monopolistic competitive final good producers, index
by j ∈ [0, 1]. Final goods producers buy intermediate goods, Xt(j) from the
intermediate goods producing firms. They then transform the intermediate goods
into final goods, Yt(j) and resell them to households. The production function of
the final goods producer is as follows:
Yt(j) = Xt(j); (1.30)
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In period t, a retailer sells Yt(j) units of the retail goods at the nominal price Pt(j).
The household consumes a bundle of retail goods, Yt =
{∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
1− 1
γ dj
} 1
1− 1γ
where
γ is the elasticity of demand for the different type of retail goods in a Stiglitz
formulation. The demand for each good is then given by
Yt(j) = [
Pt(j)
Pt
]−γYt (1.31)
where Pt is the price index given by
Pt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−γdj
1
1−γ (1.32)
The price setting is a Calvo staggered pricing following the text book version in
Gali (2009). During each period, a fraction, (1− θp) of the retailers can reset their
prices optimally while the remainder use the last period’s pricing. Each retail firm
faces the same probability of changing the price over every period. The retail firm
j then optimizes the following profit stream function when it sets the new price
P ∗t given the price of the intermediate good, P
i
t .
Et
∞∑
k=0
Λt+k|tθkp [(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)1−γYt+k − (1− τ)
P it+k
Pt+k
Xt+k(j)] (1.33)
In the above equation, the real cost for the retailer is the price of a unit of in-
termediate good measured in terms of the final good. The government provides
a subsidy to purchase the intermediate goods which is given by 1 − τ . The first
order condition with respect to P ∗t is as follows:
∞∑
k=0
Λt+k|tθkp(P
∗
t /Pt+k)
1−γYt+k =(1− τ) γ
γ − 1
Et
∞∑
k=0
Λt+k|tθkp{(P ∗t /Pt+k)−γYt+k}
1
1−α
P it+k
Pt+k
(1.34)
The government subsidy for the intermdiate good is such that it eliminates the
monopolistic distortion by offsetting the markup in the steady state equilibrium
such that:
1− τ = γ − 1
γ
(1.35)
The aggregate price transition is as follows where a proportion θ of the retailers
maintains their last period’s price while the remaining 1 − θ of firms reset their
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prices to the optimal price, P ∗t :
Pt = θpPt−1 + (1− θp)P ∗t (1.36)
Equation (1.34) together with equation (1.36) gives rise to a simple log-linearized
form of NK Phillips Curve:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(
P̂ it
Pt
) (1.37)
where κ = (1−βθp)(1−θp)
θp
).
1.4.7 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy using the following modified Taylor
rule
ln(It/I) = ρiln(It−1/I) + (1− ρi)ρpi ln(pit/pi) + (1− ρi)ρy ln(Yt/Y ) + ςt (1.38)
where I, Y and pi are the steady state values of the gross nominal interest rate,
output and gross inflation rate respectively. With policy inertia, the central bank
gradually adjusts nominal interest rate in response to movements in output and
inflation. The exogenous monetary policy shock, ςt is normally distributed with
standard distribution σi,t.
1.4.8 Closing the Model
In closing the model, the aggregate consumption and match formation costs are
equal to the aggregate output. I assume firing cost/tax is transferred to the
workers.
Ct +HnAtZ
n
t Mt(j) + cVt = Yt (1.39)
1.5 Solution
The model is solved by log-linearizing against the zero inflation steady state. The
log-linearized system of equations is as given in the appendix 1.B.
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1.5.1 Calibration and Steady State
The model is calibrated closely to the Krause and Lubik (2007) model with respect
to the calibration of the parameters relating to the endogenous separations of labor
matches. The steady state total separation rate δl is set to 0.10 as in Krause and
Lubik (2007) which was based on the evidence from Hall (1995) and Davis et al.
(1996) for the US quarterly worker separation rate. The exogenous job destruction
rate of δ is set to 0.068, or 68 % of the total separations as suggested in Davis
et al (1996). The endogenous separation rate then works out to 0.034 which is
computed as G(Z) = (0.10− 0.068)/(1− 0.068).
The idiosyncratic shock distribution is assumed to be a lognormal distribution with
mean 1 (as in Krause and Lubik (2007)) and the standard deviation 0.15 (the mid
range in the literature of between 0.12 and 0.18). With the distribution calibrated,
the various elasticities dependent on the distribution are computed. The steady
state reservation productivity, Z is computed to be 0.76. The elasticity, dlogZ¯
dlogZ
is
computed to be = 0.133. The elasticity dlogG(Z)
dlogZ
is computed to be 14.8 while the
elasticity of Φ(Zt) is computed to be 16.2. The steady state value for Φ(Zt) is
computed to be 0.025T where T is the firing tax coefficient.
The discount factor β is calibrated to 0.99 to reflect the annual average interest
rate of 4% . θp is set to 0.75 to reflect an average price duration of 1 year. The
parameter κ is then implied to be 0.0858. I set the steady state N and F according
to the evidence that average employment rate in post war US data is 0.59. The
steady state job finding rate is set to 0.7. This implies a steady state U of 0.025.
The steady state F = 0.615 giving a steady state unemployment rate U/F = 4.3%.
I set φu to 10 ( this was calibrated so as to achieve positive correlation between
inflation and labor force rate)and φn to 1.
Gali (2011), drawing upon earlier evidence by Silva and Toledo (2009), calibrates
the average cost of hiring a worker to be 4.5 % of the quarterly wage ie c
q(θ)
=
0.045W¯ in steady state. Following Zanetti (2011), the productivity of new job
matches, Zn, is calibrated to be constant at the 95th percentile of the distribution.
The adaptation cost parameter, Hn is implied from the steady state equations.
The implied calibration is an adaptation cost of 25% of the productivity loss to a
new job match and a total hiring cost of close to 30 %. This is in line with the
empirical evidence as reported by Sakellaris (2000), Barron et al (1999) and Silva
and Toledo (2011). I calibrate T to be 0.04 which correspond to a firing cost of
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4% of output at steady state for a job match. The calibration reflects the relative
insignificance of firing cost in the US Economy and is relatively in line with the fact
that unemployment benefits constitutes on average 2 quarters duration at 6% of
wage rate under regulation. This is also in line with Wesselbaum 2009 calibration
of 0.05 to 0.10.
Wage rigidity follows Albertini and Fairise (2013) with w set to 0.5. Blanchard
and Gali (2010) assumed wage rigidities values of 0.5 to 0.9 on a quarterly basis
whereas others like Faia(2008) and Albertini and Fairise(2013) uses a wage of 0.6.
The elasticity of the matching function to U ot , µ is calibrated to 0.5 which is in
line with Nagypal and Mortensen (2007)’s and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)’s
argument for the vacancy elasticity of the matching function to be between 0.3
and 0.5. Under Hosio’s condition and optimality, this implies that the workers’
bargain share of wage, η to be 0.5.
The habit formation index, h is calibrated to be 0.65, in line with the calibrations
in the literature. The relative risk adversity, σ is calibrated to 2. The monetary
policy is calibrated as follows. The persistence of the interest rate reflecting policy
inertia is calibrated to 0.7. This follows Walsh (2005) and Christiano et al (2014).
The parameters governing the monetary rule are set as ρpi = 1.5 and ρy = 0.125
which follows Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al (1999). The standard deviation of
the innovation σi = 0.025 following Smets and Wouters (2007). I set the standard
deviation of productivity shock to 0.075 with a persistence of 0.95.
1.6 Results
In this section, I evaluate the performance of the model of the artificial economy
by examining the the respective standard deviations of the key statistics and the
correlations between the key statistics as in Krause and Lubik (2007) and Ahrens
et al (2014).
Table 1.2 reports the moments of interest from the model and from the quarterly
empirical data for the US economy from 1964 to 2002. Comparing against the
moments from the empirical data, the model performs reasonably well in address-
ing the issues highlighted in the basic endogenous separation model evaluated in
Krause and Lubik (2007). Firstly, it achieves a strong negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies, thereby restoring the Beveridge curve relationship.
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Table 1.2: Moments of the theoretical model
Standard Deviations Data Unconditional
Moments
Monetary
Shocks
Technology
Shocks
Output (1.62) (0.86) (0.21) (0.84)
Real Wage 0.69 0.53 0.80 0.51
Inflation 0.19 0.53 0.17(0.19)2 0.54(0.27)2
Employment 0.60 0.75 0.95 0.74
Unemployment 6.9 10.9 12.3 10.8
Vacancy 8.27 10.0 10.0 10.0
Tightness 14.96 9.7 10.2 9.63
Job Creation Rate 2.55 6.5 6.2 6.42
Job Destruction Rate 3.73 0.95 0.80 0.96
Labor Force 0.3 0.62 0.72(0.2)2 0.62(0.39)2
Correlations
U,V -0.96 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99
JCR, JDR -0.36 -0.97 -0.99 -0.97
Labor Force, Y 0.30 0.05 0.78(0.31)2 -
0.02(0.02)2
Y,Inflation 0.39 -0.60 0.79(0.4)2 -0.68(0.6)2
1 The standard deviations are relative to the standard deviation of output except
for output.
2 (.) for Labor Force represents values of US Economy taken from Gali (2011).
The job creation rate and job destruction rate are now negatively correlated. The
job creation rate is much less volatile than highlighted in the Krause and Lubik
model and is in line with the empirical moment. These improvements in the model
are achieved with an average wage rate that is in line with the volatility of the his-
torical average wage rate, a low firing cost and worker turn-over cost (training and
adaptation cost )that are in line with the US economy. However, the model fails
to produce the positive correlation between output and inflation as pointed out
by Krause and Lubik (2007). The moments for inflation conditional on monetary
shocks matches relatively well the empirical data, although it is more positively
correlated than the empirical data. However, the technology shock in the model
produces a strong counter-factual negative correlation between inflation and out-
put. However, it is important to note that the model does not feature capital
and other shocks impinging on the US economy. An important shock that is not
studied in the model is that of investment specific technology shock. A richer
model with capital and investment specific technology shocks would yield further
insights into this issue.
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The model matches relatively well with regards to the unconditional moments for
labor force participation although the standard deviation is higher than the stan-
dard deviation in the empirical data. The conditional moments with respect to
technology shocks are relatively in line with the empirical data, showing acycli-
cality and a slightly stronger volatility. However, conditional on monetary shocks,
labor force participation rate is much more volatile and procyclical than the empir-
ical data. The latter issue is however inherent in models in Campolmi and Gnocchi
(2014)’s and Gali (2011)’s versions of endogenous labor participation with regards
to consumption shocks. This is because in the model with labor matching, the
highly volatile and procyclical job finding rate dominates the counter effects from
income effects. More frictions are needed in the model. Erceg and Levin (2013)
features adjustment cost for labor participation. Christiano et al(2014) features
habit formation for home production. Another aspect is that of labor search effort.
It could be argued that procyclical labor search arising from the increase in job
finding rate could manifest in increase search effort and labor force participation
rate with the increase in search effort substituting for the labor participation rate.
The impulse response functions to an interest rate rate policy shock of 0.25% are
given in Figure 1.1 while the impulse response functions to a technology shock of
0.75% are given in Figure 1.2. A policy shock in the form of an interest shock
reduces consumption and results in a lower inflation. Both employment rate and
labor force participation rate decrease. The earlier is a combination of the lower
job finding rate and a higher separation rate. The lower labor force participa-
tion rate is the result of a lower employment rate while the increase in searching
workers is not strong enough to counteract the decrease in the employment rate
resulting in a labor force participation rate that is procyclical and volatile but less
volatile and procyclical than the employment rate. This is also partly because the
income effect is not strong enough. The property of the Beveridge curve where
u,v move strongly in opposite directions in shown in Figure 1.1c. Likewise, the
impulse response function for job creation and destruction shows strong negative
correlation in Figure 1.1d.
The impulse response functions for technology shocks in Figure 1.2 shows a typ-
ical response to technology shocks. Consumption increases to a positive technol-
ogy shock, a negative inflation results because of the stickiness of nominal price
in the Calvo setting. Employment reduces as firms reduces output because the
consumption increase is not strong enough due to habit formation and nominal
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price rigidity. Labor force participation reduces due to the income effect over as
well as the lower job finding rate. The negative correlation between u,v and the
job creation and job destruction rates are demonstrated in the impulse response
functions.
1.7 Conclusions
The model that is developed here brings together in a New Keynesian model,
endogenous job separations, endogenous labor participation rate and worker turn
over costs. The basic endogenous separation model exhibits several issues as high-
lighted in Krause and Lubik (2007). Yet, endogenous separation models are impor-
tant in the study of firing costs and labor institutions. There are several extensions
of the basic Krause and Lubik (2007) model (see Zanetti (2011), Campolmi and
Faia (2011) and Ahrens et al. ( 2014)) which rely on high separation costs and
/or wage rigidity to resolve some of the issues with varying degrees of success.
The model presented here achieves performance improvements in resolving three
of the hurdles: a) the positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies,
b)the positive correlation between the job creation rate and job separation rates
and c) the high volatility rate of the job creation rate. The model also exhibits
standard deviation for tightness, unemployment rate and vacancy rate are in line
with the data with a wage rate that is relatively as volatile as the empirical average
wage rate.
The current literature for policy evaluation with respect to labor institutions
and unemployment insurance emphasizes job separation costs (see Zanetti (2011),
Campolmi and Faia (2011) and Ahrens et al.(2014)). Yet, as highlighted in Wes-
selbaum (2009), job separation costs in the US economy are low and cannot resolve
the issues in the basic endogenous job separation model. Significantly, as pointed
out in empirical studies on labor hiring (see Sakellaris (2000) and Barron(1999))
labor match formation costs include a significant component in the form of adap-
tation costs and productivity losses as well as training costs. These costs are
mostly ignored in models (except for a few research work like Silva and Toledo
(2009) and (2011)). This paper contributes to the literature by bringing these
cost components into the endogenous job separation model with an improvement
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(a) Y, pi and i
(b) labor force part. and employment
Figure 1.1: Impulse response to interest rate shock of 0.25%
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(c) u, v and θ
(d) job creation and job destruction
Figure 1.1: Continued - Impulse response to interest rate shock of 0.25%
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(a) Y, pi
(b) labor force part. and employment
Figure 1.2: Impulse response to technology shock of 0.75%
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(c) u, v and θ
(d) job creation and job destruction
Figure 1.2: Continued - Impulse response to technology shock of 0.75%
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in performance. The model shows that in place of separation costs, worker re-
placement costs from productivity losses due to adaptation costs and training in
new hires can play an important role for endogenous separation models.
The model does not resolve the negative correlation between the inflation rate and
output as highlighted in the unconditional correlation moment between the infla-
tion rate and output. A closer examination shows that this arises from the negative
correlation between inflation and output with respect to technology shocks. How-
ever, we need to view this in the context of the model featuring only labor and
that capital investment and investment technology specific shocks have been ab-
stracted away. Further investigations can be conducted in a richer model featuring
these elements. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014) and Nucci and Rigg (2014) also
introduced other shocks like preference shocks that change the composition of the
shock contribution in order to bring the model performance closer to data.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.A Calibration
Parameter Description Value Source
β Discount factor 0.99
γ Elasticity of substitu-
tion of Final Goods
6 markup of 20%
θ Fract. of Producers
not able to reset price
0.75 Average wage dura-
tion of 1 year
µ Elasticity of matching
function to u
0.5 Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2003)
η Worker’s share of
wage bargain
0.5 Hosios Condition
- Nagypal and
Mortensen
T Firing Tax Coefficient 0.04 around 2 quarters of
6% of wage rate
Hn Adaptation Cost and
Training Cost
0.25 Steady State Eqs and
Sakellaris (2000)
w Wage Rigidity 0.5 Blanchard and Gali
(2010)
φ Elasticity of νn 1 target volatility of
wage rate
φu Elasticity of νu 10 target correlation of
labor part. with Y
Table 1.A.1: Calibration targets -1
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Parameter Description Value Source
c
q(θ)
Average cost of filling
a job
0.045 quar-
terly wage
Silva and
Toledo(2005)
f(θ) Steady state job find-
ing rate
0.7 Gali(2011)
δl Steady state total sep-
aration
0.10 Krause and Lu-
bik(2007)
δ Exogenous Job sepa-
ration rate
0.068 Davis et al(1996)
µ(Z) Mean of G(Z) 1 Krause and Lu-
bik(2007)
σz Standard Deviation of
G(Z)
0.15 Mid range in litera-
ture
h index of external habit
formation
0.65 Lower range in liter-
atue
ρpi monetary response to
inflation
1.5 Taylor(1999) Clarida
et al(1999)
ρy monetary response to
output
0.125 Taylor(1999) Clarida
et al(1999)
ρi interest rate smooth-
ing
0.7 Christiano(2014)
Walsh(2005)
ρa technology shock per-
sistence
0.95
σa standard deviation of
technology shocks
0.075
σi standard deviation of
monetary shocks
0.025 Smets and Wouters
(2007)
Table 1.A.2: Calibration Targets -2
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Appendix 1.B Loglinearized Model
The log-linearized system of equations for the economy is presented in this section.
(a)NK Phillips curve in real marginal costs:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(
P̂ it
Pt
) (1.40)
In equation (1.40), the inflation rate pit = logPt/Pt−1, κ =
(1−βθp)(1−θp)
θp
) and
(̂
P it
Pt
) = logP it − logPt.
(b)Intertemporal substitution equation for bonds:
− iˆt =
(
1
1− hct −
h
1− hct−1
)
− Et
(
1
1− hct+1 −
h
1− hct
)
− Etpit+1 (1.41)
where iˆt = it + log β.
(c)Monetary policy rule (1.38)
iˆt = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)ρpipit + (1− ρi)ρyyt + ςt (1.42)
(d)Production function:
yt = at +
(1− δ)NZ¯
Y
(− G(Z)
1−G(Z)η
G
z zt +nt−1 + η
z¯
zzt) +
f(θo)U oZn
Y
((1−µ)θot +U ot )
(1.43)
(e)Labor Force Participation
ft =
U
F
ut +
N
F
nt (1.44)
(f)End of period unemployment rate
ut =
f(θo)
1− f(θo)(1− µ)θˆ
o
t + u
o
t (1.45)
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(g)Labor transition equation
nt = (1− δ)(1−G(Z))
[ −G(Z)
1−G(Z)η
G
z zt + nt−1
]
+
f(θo)U
(1− f(θo))N {(1− µ)θˆ
o
t + u
o
t}
(1.46)
where ηGz is the elasticity of G(Zt) with respect to the cut off reservation produc-
tivity Zt.
(h)Job creation equations
µθot =
1
c
q(θ)
(Zn(
Pˆ it
Pt
+ a)−Wnwn,t −HnZn(P
i
t
Pt
+ a) + ξ¯ξt) (1.47)
(i)Definition of ξ̂t
ξ̂t = mt−mt+1− G(Z)
1−G(Z)η
G
z zt+
β(1− δ)
ξ¯
(Z¯(
P̂ it+1
Pt+1
+at+1+η
Z¯
z zt+1)−W (Z¯)w(zt+1)−ΦηΦz zt+1t+ξ¯ξt+1)
(1.48)
(j)Definition of m
m =
(
1
1− hct −
h
1− hct−1
)
(1.49)
(k)Average Wage
ˆ¯wt =(1− w)
{
ηZ¯
W¯
(
(̂
P it
Pt
) + at + η
z¯
zzt
)
+
ηT Z¯
W¯
ηz¯zzt −
βη(1− δ)T
W¯
[mt − Et(mt+1)]
+
(1− η)M¯χNφ
W¯
(mt + φnt)
}
(1.50)
(l)Wage of new hired
wˆnt =(1− w)
{
ηZ¯n
W¯n
(
(̂
P it
Pt
) + at
)
− βη(1− δ)T
W¯n
[mt − Et(mt+1)]
+
(1− η)M¯χNφ
W¯n
(mt + φnt)
} (1.51)
(m)Job destruction equation
µθot =
1
c
q(θ)
{Zn((̂P
i
t
Pt
)+at)−Z((̂P
i
t
Pt
)+at+zt)−Wnwn,t+W (z)zt−TZzt−HnZn((
P it
Pt
)+at)
(1.52)
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(n)Labor Participation equation
φuu
o
t = −mt + (1− µ)θot + vnt (1.53)
(o) Definition of vnt (value function of a new hire to the household)
vnt =
Wn
Vn
wn,t−χM¯N
φ
Vn
(m+φn)+
β(1− δ)Ve
Vn
(−G(Z)/(1−G(Z))ηGz zt+1+m−mt+1+vet+1)
(1.54)
(p)Average value of an employed worker to the household
vet =
W¯
Ve
w¯t−χM¯N
φ
Ve
(m+φn)+
β(1− δ)Ve
Ve
(− G(Z)
(1−G(Z))η
G
z zt+1+m−mt+1+vet+1)
(1.55)
(q)Aggregate quantities
yt =
C
Y
ct +
c
q(θ)
f(θ)U
(1− f(θ))Y (θt + u
o
t ) +
HnZnf(θ)U
o
Y
((1−µ)θt + uot + at +
P̂ it
Pt
) (1.56)
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Frictional Physical Capital and
Labor Markets
2.1 Abstract
In this paper, I worked with a Real Business Cycle model incorporating matching
frictions in the physical capital and labor markets in the presence of fixed sunk
in cost in both labor and capital matching to evaluate the implications of such
frictions in the generation of key business cycle characteristics. This is in view of
the issues highlighted in Shimer(2005) that a typical labor matching model is not
able to generate the empirical characteristics of a business cycle. With the model
incorporating matching frictions and adjustment costs documented in empirical
studies in Barron(1996) et al in a model where labor supply is endogenous and a
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman utility preference, I evaluate the performance
of the model and conclude that the model can generate the volatility of the mar-
ket tightness in the empirical data despite a flexible wage and an opportunity cost
for labor that is highly procyclical and volatile. Nevertheless, investment exhib-
ited very little amplification effect. I further subject the model to news shock to
evaluate the impact from the use of unmatched capital and labor to news shocks.
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2.2 Introduction
Labor market frictions in the form of matching friction is well accepted amongst
researchers in explaining the presence of a pool of unmatched workers who are
available yet unemployed in the production process. However, the incorporation
of the Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides matching framework in DSGE models
to model labor market is problematic in that it is generally not able to replicate
the business cycle characteristics exhibited in the empirical data.
The physical capital market exhibits a similar trait as the labor market. In the
literature, there are studies on used physical capital market as well as inven-
tory management which includes unsold durable goods such as equipment and
machineries used as capital goods. The physical capital market resembles that
of labor market with unsold inventories and ”old” physical capital that are not
”matched” to entrepreneurs and firms due to separation. The reasons for the
matching frictions are quite similar. Physical capital is often specific to a location
whether it is an office or a manufacturing plant. Machineries are also specific to
a particular function. Like the labor market, there are vacant office buildings and
inventories that takes time to be sold and employed by firms. Likewise there are
physical capital that are separated from matches and rejoin the pool that are to
be re-matched. There are substantive literature on inventory management and to
a much lesser extent used physical capital.
Matching costs in the form of fixed sunk in cost have been demonstrated in two
papers by Silva and Toledo (2009) and (2011) and discussed in Pissarides (2009)
and Nagypal and Mortensen (2009) as one mechanism in the partial resolution of
the volatility puzzle highlighted in Shimer (2005). Empirical studies by Sakellaris
(2000), Barron et al (1999) on adjustment costs highlight that substantial training
and adaptation costs are incurred in the first quarter of a newly hired worker
and in the case of installation of equipment, productivity loss is incurred. In the
matching models, these costs in addition to direct search costs affect the volatility
of matching rate under the assumption of free-entry in creation of vacancies.
As an extension, I address the question of how substantive is the effect of the avail-
ability of the excess capacity in the economy in the form of unmatched capital and
labor. Theoretically, the economy can make use of these resources by increasing
vacancies/search activities when faced with surprise shocks as well as news shocks.
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There are substantial research work into models involving news shocks and get-
ting the models to generate Pigou cycle characteristics which basically requires
getting consumption, investment, output and employment rate to move in tan-
dem in response to news shocks. Beaudry and Portier (2003) first highlighted the
difficulty in producing Pigou Cycles in a one sector RBC model. The literature
also includes other works by Christiano et al (2008), Karnizova (2011), denHaan
and Kaltenbrunner(2009), denHaan and Lozej(2010) in addressing the issues of
producing a Pigou Cycle in a RBC model with respect to a news shock.
The presence of a highly volatile inventory investment in the economy has been
the focus of several research works which attempt to evaluate its significance on
the business cycle. While I study the matching model in the narrower perspective
of finished physical capital goods, some of the perspective and model performance
can be related to the empirical behavior of finished durable good inventory and
its correlation to the business cycle behaviors of sales and output. Although the
model in this paper is different from the stock elastic demand inventory model of
Bils and Kahn (2000) by focussing on matching frictions, a matching model shares
some similarity with the stock elastic demand model in the availability of unsold
stock and how the sale of the unsold stock is dependent on the inventory stock.
This constitutes an additional area of study in this paper.
2.3 Literature
In seeking to explain labor market, current research works often incorporate a
frictional labor market into business cycle models in the form of a DMP match-
ing mechanism. Yet, this approach has met with a major challenge highlighted
in Shimer (2005). In that paper, Shimer demonstrated the inability of the DMP
matching model to reproduce the empirical behavior of the labor market in busi-
ness cyles. The simple DMP model with Nash wage bargaining generates labor
market tightness that is too small compared to the empirical data. To resolve
this, an often used approach is to incorporate a degree of wage rigidity often in
the form of staggered wage contracts, wage norms and Hall and Milgrom (2008)’s
alternate bargaining mechanism. The approach has however been met with crit-
icisms - see Pissarides (2009) and Haefke et al (2013). In particular, the authors
argue that starting wage which is critical in influencing the hiring rate of worker
is very flexible with an elasticity of close to one with labor productivity.
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A partial resolution in the amplification of labor market tightness is that of match
fixed cost as suggested in Nagypal and Mortensen (2007), Pissarides (2009), Siva
and Toledo (2009) and (2011) and others. Siva and Toledo (2009) and (2011)
draw upon the empirical information from Barron (1999) and Sicilian (2001) on
labor costs in the form of training costs. Both of these studies reveal insignificant
effect on starting wages from training costs (of less than 5%). Hence the training
costs are modelled as sunk in costs not subject to worker and firms bargaining.
Recent works on labor hiring costs which includes Dube et al (2010) and Samuel
and Mirjam (2015) also highlighted training and adaptation/disruption costs. An
earlier study, Sakellaris (2000) documents the decrease in productivity at the plant
level for the period following an investment spike or employment spike, highlighting
empirical evidence of adaptation cost and disruption costs associated with the
introduction of newly hired workers and the installation of capital. The initial
period of adaptation and disruption results in an output productivity decline in
the immediate period of hiring and installation.
The earlier approaches to augment the volatility of market tightness and unem-
ployment in the models also rely on calibrating a high level for the disutility of
labor and replacement rate. Nagypal and Mortensen(2007) suggests the calibra-
tion of the level of replacement rate and disutility to be sufficiently high of around
0.72. On the other hand, Hagedorn and Manovski(2008) calibrated a model with
a level of 0.95. The approaches assume most importantly that the level of labor
disutility and replacement rate are also constant and does not comove with labor
productivity, thus inducing a greater degree of wage rigidity to labor productivity.
Chodowrow-Reich and Karababounis (2016) proposes instead that the level of la-
bor disutility comoves strongly with labor productivity using standard formulation
of utility functions.
Additionally, in the standard Nash bargain wage formulation, a portion of the
wage accounts for the outside option of finding a job in the second period. This
portion accounts for about 30% of the wage (in Shimer (2005)) and is a very
volatile component that comoves very strongly with labor productivity due to its
dependence on the fast moving job finding rate. To reduce the degree of this
co-movement, researchers often introduce wage rigidity through labor bargaining,
norm wages and strategic bargaining (Hall and Milgrom(2008)) - see Christiano et
al. (2014), Gali (2010) for examples. However, if the disutility of job search and
labor participation is accounted, the outside option of finding a job would have
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been offset by the disutility of labor participation in a competitive search setting.
Gali (2011) modeled labor participation in a NK setting where the outside option
of job search is offset by the disutility of labor participation. However, Nucci and
Riggi(2014), Campolmi and Gnocchi(2014) discusses NK models with particpation
rate while maintaining the outside option and imposes wage rigidity in the form of
norm wages. Christiano et al(2014) develops a model of labor participation with
credible strategic bargaining following Hall and Milgrom(2008).
The treatment of physical capital market as a market with matching frictions
giving rise to a pool of both available and unmatched capital goods that includes
separated capital goods has been explored in works dealing with re-used capital.
Empirical studies in the re-used capital goods like Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005)
who studied the reallocation of capital highlight the procyclicality and significance
of re-used capital in business cycles. According to Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005), the
re-allocation of capital including merger and acquisition makes up approximately
one quarter of total investment per quarter. Around one third of the re-allocation
comprises of direct sales of plant and equipment between firms. Kurmann and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) built a RBC model with a physical capital market with
matching frictions. However the model when calibrated does not exhibit any
significant deviation from a standard RBC in performance. Ottonello (2015), on
the other hand, used a physical capital matching model to highlight that matching
frictions inhibiting reallocation results in slow economic recovery after a recession.
The physical capital market in the DSGE models of Kurmann and Petrosky-
Nadeau (2007) and Ottonello (2015) focused on re-used capital but implicitly
implies unsold inventory of capital goods as finished durable goods. As such,
the models should address empirical behavior of inventory and sales for durable
goods exhibited in the data. Bils and Kahn(2000) explored a stock elastic demand
model for finished goods product, which shares similar characteristics to a match-
ing model. Recent works on the application of matching models on finished goods
include Wasmer and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), Bai et al (2012). denHaan (2013)
evaluated the volatility and persistence amplification arising from the goods mar-
ket frictions while confronting the empirical behavior of inventory and sales in the
business cycle. When disciplined against the empirical behavior of inventory, he
concluded that the goods market frictions are quantitatively not very important.
While the scope of investigation in this paper is limited to the physical capital
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goods market, the inventory behavior of physical capital goods should not deviate
too significantly from the inventory behavior of durable goods.
Finally, as an extension of the model, we explore the implication of the availabil-
ity of a pool of unmatched capital goods (both separated and unsold inventory
of finished goods) to news shocks in addition to neutral technology shocks. The
difficulty of generating Pigou Cycles in which consumption, investment, employ-
ment and output rises together in reaction to good news was first highlighted in
Beaudry and Portier (2003). Several papers approached the problem from several
angles. Christiano et al(2008) developed a model of internalised habit forma-
tion, investment adjustment cost and variable capital utilisation in a frictional
monetary model with an accomodating monetary authority. Beaudry and Portier
(2003) utilised a multi-sector model approach. Krusell and McKay(2010) in a re-
view article suggested the use of labor matching model over the use of a GHH ie
Greenwood et al(1988) preference model to eliminate the wealth effect in the sup-
ply labor which is essential in generating the increase in labor supply. DenHaan
and Kaltenbrunner(2009) and DenHaan and Lozej(2010) explored labor matching
model with the latter in an open economy context to reproduce pigou cycles. Link-
ing news shocks and inventory facts, Crouzet and Oh(2014) estimated a DSGE
model which reported that news shocks play an insignificant part in the business
cycle.
2.4 Model
I augment the basic RBC model in Rebelo and King (2000) with a physical capital
market and a labor market with matching frictions. This is along the line of
models by Kurmann and Nadeau (2007) and Ottonello (2015). There are two
types of agents in the model, households and firms. Households supply labor
and capital. The latter is converted from consumption goods into capital goods.
Households hold unused capital goods ie they hold both an inventory of unsold
capital goods waiting to be matched to firms as well as served as a liquidity provider
to firms by buying the unused capital goods. Firms are employers of labor and
renters of capital. Firms produce consumption goods which households buy for
consumption or buy to convert to capital goods. Matching frictions exists in the
capital market and labour markets. The modelling of households holding inventory
and leasing capital model can be adapted into a capital producing goods using the
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same argument as Greenwood et al (2000) and is used here as a simplification of
the model.
2.4.1 Timing of model
Each time period consists of the following activities. At the beginning of the pe-
riod, the aggregate productivity is observed. Hiring follows with both households
and firms aware of the aggregate productivity, similar to the line of work of Gali
and Blanchard (2010) and Gali (2010). Production then proceeds after the hiring.
Separations of labor and capital employed by the firm and depreciation of capital
occurs after the production finishes, The household then decide how much to in-
vest as capital goods and this is followed by the matching process of the physical
capital with the firms. Capital can only be used in the next period production
which is in line with the one period ahead install time for capital in most of the
literature.
2.4.2 Representative Household
Households in the economy are modeled as a large representative household as
in Merz (1999) with complete insurance of consumption amongst members. The
representative household consumes and finances its consumption from wage, un-
employment benefits, profits from firms which the representative household owns
and rental of capital. The representative household smoothes its consumption by
converting some of the consumption goods into capital stocks for rental income
from the firms. The representative household discounts expected flow utility of
consumption U
(
Ct
)
over consumption Ct with a time discount factor of 0 < β < 1
where β is the time discount factor. The lifetime utility function which the housh-
old optimises is as follows:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Ct, Nt, U
o
t
)
(2.1)
subject to a period budgetary constraint of
Ct + Invt ≤ WtNt + b(1−Nt) + rk,tKt + pit (2.2)
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In equation (2.2), the household consumption Ct and investment in physical capi-
tal, Invt, is financed by revenue from the wage, Wt from Nt employed households,
the unemployment benefits b, from its unemployed workers and the return from
the capital that is rented to firms. The labor force is normalized to 1. At the
beginning of the period, the household decides on the number of unmatched mem-
bers to participate in the job search and this is denoted by U ot incurring a disutility
from the search activities. The household also owns(but does not decide on the
portfolio holding) the firms which yield the return of profits from the firm pit. The
representative household maximizes consumption by its choice of investment Invt.
The household holds both inventory of unmatched capital assets, Lt and capital
assets that is rented out to the firms, Kt. The transitions for both labor and
capital are subject to separations as well as market frictions in the labor and cap-
ital markets with the probability of finding a match given by fn(θn,t) and fk(θk,t)
respectively. Both are functions of the respective market tightness, θn,t and θk,t.
The household capital asset that is successfully rented out to firms, Kt is subject
to depreciation, δk and exogenous separation, se. In addition, successful matches
at the end of the period for the liquid assets, fk(θk,t)Lt augments the next period
capital that is rented out to the firms:
Kt+1 = (1− δk)(1− se)Kt + (fk(θk,t))Lt (2.3)
The amount of investment spending in the economy is hence (fk(θk,t))Lt. The liq-
uid asset that the houshold holds for matching consists of unmatched liquid assets
from the last period (as represented by the first term on the RHS in equation 2.4),
investment goods produced this period and recovered capital from the exogenous
separation which is subjected to a recovery rate of ψ. The depreciation rate of the
unmatched asset is δk.
Lt = (1− fk(θk,t−1))(1− δk)Lt−1 + Invt + ψ(1− δk)seKt (2.4)
Firms labor stock evolves as follows:
Nt = (1− δn)Nt−1 + fn(θn,t)U ot (2.5)
where labor stock is subject to match separations of labor at the rate of δn. U
o
t is
the number of unemployed household members at the beginning of period partic-
ipating in the labor matching market.
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The household’s per period utility function is assumed to take the following form:
U(Ct, Nt, U
o
t ) =
(Ct − νn(Nt)1−σ
1− σ − νu(U
o
t ) (2.6)
In equation 2.6, the parameter 1/σ is intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
νn(Nt) is the disutility of labor associated with the household supplying Nt of
labor and νu(U
o
t ) is the disutility of labor search costs. The formulation of the
utility functions draws from Greenwood et al(1988) which removes the effect of
wealth on the disutility of labor. With this utility function, the response of wage to
labor productivity is more in line with the empirical characteristics as documented
by Pissarides (2009) and Haefkle et al (2013).
Household optimization condition The household optimizes its lifetime util-
ity by choosing its savings options in Lt. By substituting equation (2.4) into
equation (2.2), we have
Ct+Lt = WtNt+b(1−Nt)+rk,tKt+pit+(1−fk(θk,t−1))(1−δk)Lt−1 +ψ(1−δk)seKt
(2.7)
I denote the Lagrange multipler on the household budget equation (2.7) as Λt and
the multiplier on the liquid asset transition ie equation (2.4) as λt. The Lagrangian
(L) set up is as follows:
L =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{U(Ct, Nt, U ot )− Λt[{Ct + Lt −WtNt − b(1−Nt)−
rk,tKt − pit − (1− fk(θk,t−1))(1− δk)Lt−1 − ψ(1− δk)seKt}+
λt(Kt+1 − (1− δk)(1− se)Kt − (fk(θk,t))Lt)
] (2.8)
First order condition for Ct gives Λt = β
tUc(Ct, Nt, U
o
t ) and the stochastic discount
factor,
Λt+1|t = Λt+1/Λt = βUc(Ct+1, Nt+1, U ot+1))/Uc(Ct, Nt, U
o
t )
The first order conditions for Lt and Kt+1 are as follows:
1 = EtΛt+1|t(1− fk(θk,t))(1− δk) + fk(θk,t)λt (2.9)
λt = EtΛt+1|t
[
rk,t+1 + (1− δk)(1− se)λt+1 + ψ(1− δk)se
]
(2.10)
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In equation (2.9), the marginal cost of giving up one unit of consumption in
equilibrium equals the average return of the shadow value of matched liquid asset
and unmatched liquid asset. The shadow value of capital, λt is given by (2.10)
which returns a continual stream of capital rental return subjected to depreciation
and separation. In the event of separation, only a portion is recovered as given by
ψ. The return is lower the less the recoverable amount in the event of separation.
As usual the transversality condition holds through appropriate calibrations for a
solution to the optimization problem.
2.4.3 Representative Firm
The representative firm observes an exogenous technology At at the beginning
of the period. Given an existing stock of capital, Kt, the firm decides the labor
input, Nt to produce output Yt by posting job vacancies Vn,t at the cost of cn taking
the labor market tightness i.e. θn,t as given. The firm’s production function is a
constant returns to scale technology:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (2.11)
At the end of each period, the firm also decides the capital stock for the next
period, Kt+1. The firm does this by posting the necessary vacancies, vk,t at the
cost of ck to decide the next period capital holdings taking the market tightness
of the physical capital market θk,t as given. Hired labor starts production within
the period while new capital starts production one period later. The objective
function which the firm optimizes every period is the present value of future profit
streams discounted by the stochastic discount factor Λt+s|t. The value function,
Vt, is obtained by choosing the vacancies, vk,t and vn,t to place in each period in
the physical capital and labor markets respectively.
V (Kt, Nt−1) = max{vn,t+s,vk,t+s}∞s=0
Yt−NtWt−φt−rk,tKt+EtΛt+1|tV (Kt+1, Nt) (2.12)
where φt represents adjustment costs related to labor hiring and the installation
of new capital and is given as follows:
φt = (cn/q(θn,t) + Ca,n)hn,t + (ck/q(θk,t))it (2.13)
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In equation (2.13), hn,t is the labor hiring and is equivalent to qn(θn,t)vn,t. Likewise,
firms’ investment, it is equal to fk(θt)Lt = qk(θk,t)vk,t, which is the matching
success rate for the firm’s vacancies created for the period. The adjustment cost
consists of search costs for both labor and capital, cn/q(θn,t)hn,t and (ck/q(θk,t))it
as well as a training and adaptation cost, Ca,hn,t for each new hire. Adaptation
cost is not modelled in capital because of the one period ahead installation lead
time assumption which includes the cost of installation. The transition equation
for the firm’s labor stock is subject to job separations δn and evolves according to
equation (2.14) as follows:
Nt = (1− δn)Nt−1 + qn(θn,t)vn,t (2.14)
The capital transition for the firm is as given in equation (2.3) which implies
consistency between firms’ capital holdings and households’ capital holdings that
is rented out.
Aggregate Productivity Shocks I restrict the model to only shocks to ag-
gregate productivity, At, such that the evolution of aggregate productivity is as
follows:
log(At) = ρa log(At−1) + ea,t (2.15)
where ea,t is the exogenous shock to productivity in period t and is IID normal
across periods and ρa is the measure of persistence of the technology shock.
2.4.4 Labor and Physical Market Capital Frictions
Labor Market Contemporaneous hiring in a frictional market in which the
hired workers are immediately productive is illustrated in works like Gali (2010)
and Blanchard and Gali (2010). I have modelled as such to replicate the spot
market mechanism in the RBC model for labor but with matching frictions. This
features hiring taking place at the start of the period when the aggregate produc-
tivity, At is drawn and observed by households and firms.
The labor market frictions is characterized by successful matches produced by
a matching function in the form of a Cobb Douglas production function using
vacancy postings, vn,t and the number of unemployed workers sent by the house-
hold to search for jobs at the beginning of the period, U ot as inputs. Accordingly,
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the matching function is characterized by both constant return to scale and and
concavity to each input. The matching function is as follows:
Mn,t = mn (U
o
t )
µn (vn,t)
1−µn (2.16)
In the above equation, mn denotes the efficiency of the matching function and µn
denotes the elasticity of hiring to unemployment and 0 < µn < 1. The matching
function then gives the following identities. When the market tightness is θn,t
which is defined as vn,t
Uot
the firm finds a worker with probability, qn(θn,t) while the
worker faces a job finding probability of fn(θn,t). The identities are as follows:
qn(θn,t) = mn (θn,t)
−µn (2.17a)
fn(θn,t) = mn (θn,t)
1−µn (2.17b)
Physical Capital Market The households convert consumption goods into
physical capital good, one for one costlessly. Physical capital are held by the
households with only a portion unmatched, Lt and the remaining matched and
rented out to the firms, Kt . Physical capital that is held by the households,
Lt, are matched to the firms in a frictional search market characterized by a
market tightness of θk,t. The market tightness, θk,t, is defined as
vk,t
Lt
where the
denominator is the amount of non-productive asset which participates fully in the
search market. The equivalent elasticity of successful matches to unproductive
asset that is searching for firms to rent to in the market is given by µk where
0 < µk < 1. The matching function, Mk,t,and the respective search probabilities
of success for firms, qk(θk,t) and households,fk(θk,t) for the physical capital market
are identical to those in the earlier paragraph for labor market namely (2.16),
(2.17a) and (2.17b).
Mk,t = mkL
µk
t (vk,t)
1−µk (2.18)
qk(θk,t) = mk (θk,t)
−µk (2.19a)
fk(θk,t) = mk (θk,t)
1−µk (2.19b)
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2.4.5 Equilibrium Wage
The wage bargaining process follows the simple Nash bargaining rule in most liter-
ature. As in Gali (2010) and Blanchard and Gali (2010), the wage is determined by
the marginal worker. As in Gali (2010), the outside option for the worker is driven
to zero because of the entry of searching workers in the beginning of the period.
Waiting for another period would require search costs at the beginning of the next
period. The surplus of the marginal worker to the representative household, Sw,t
is as follows:
Sw,t = wt − b− ν ′(Nt) + (1− δn)EtΛt+1|tSw,t+1 (2.20)
The value of the marginal worker to the firm, Jt is as follows:
Jt = (1− α)AtKαt N−αt − wt + (1− δn)EtΛt+1|tJt+1 (2.21)
The value of a vacancy to the firm, Vt is as follows:
Vt = −cn + qn(θn,t)Jt + (1− qn(θn,t))EtΛt+1|tVt+1 (2.22)
Wage Negotiation In recent literature, various wage determination based on
microfoundations have been proposed to raise the low volatility of market tight-
ness in a calibrated labor matching models which was first highlighted in Shimer
(2005). These schemes involve wage rigidities, Hall (1997) and alternate offers
bargaining, Hall and Milgrom (2009). In this paper, I use the standard Nash
bargaining mechanism in the canonical DMP model for the marginal worker bar-
gaining and abstract away any wage rigidity assumption except for the rigidity in
the replacement rate. I also abstract away intra-firm wage bargaining that is em-
ployed frequently in multi-worker firm, Stole and Zwiebel (1996). I follow loosely
the same methodology in Blanchard and Gali (2010) in deriving the equilibrium
wage, wt. Under Nash bargaining, firms and households bargain over the total
marginal surplus of both the firms and the households, Sw,t + Jt − Vt. With η as
the bargaining strength of the workers, wage is determined as
wt = argmax
wt
Sηw,t(Jt − Vt)1−η (2.23)
The outcome of the Nash bargaining is characterized as follows:
(1− η)Sw,t = η(Jt − Vt) (2.24)
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wt = η(1− α)AtKαt N−αt + (1− η)(b+ ν ′n(Nt)) (2.25)
Free Entry Condition for Labor Matches The assumption of free entry
condition (in the absence of fixed overhead) results in the following
Vt ≤ 0 (2.26)
Equation (2.26) holds in equality if vacancies for labor, vn,t > 0. Our model does
not assume fixed cost overhead for labor matches like Hornstein et al (2007). Mod-
els dealing with that introduce an additional impact on the fundamental surplus
on the labor matching (see Ljunqvist and Sargent (2015)) to increase the volatility
of labor market tightness. Equation (2.26) holding in equality implies
Jt =
cn
qn(θn,t)
+ Ca,n (2.27)
Combining equations (2.27) and (2.21), the transition equation for labor market
tightness, θn,t is given as follows:
cn
qn(θn,t)
+Ca, n = (1−α)AtKαt N−αt −wt+(1−δn)EtΛt+1|t(
cn
qn(θn,t+1)
+Ca, n) (2.28)
2.4.6 Equilibrium Capital Compensation
The determination for the rental of capital, rk,t, follows the familiar Nash bargain
mechanism. When matched, the firm and the household bargain over the price of
capital compensation period by period. The value of the match to the household
is V ek,t.
V ek,t = rk,t + (1− δk)seψ + (1− δk)(1− se)EtΛt+1|tV ek,t+1 (2.29)
The value for an unmatched capital is
V uk,t = 1− δk (2.30)
The surplus of the household from accepting the rental price and leasing out the
matched capital is V ek,t−V uk,t. On the firm’s end, the matched capital provides the
firm with a stream of marginal capital productivities against which the firm has
to pay rental but is subject to separation and depreciation. The value of capital
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match to the firm, Jkt , is as follows:
Jk,t = αAtK
α−1
t N
1−α
t − rk,t + (1− δk)(1− se)EtΛt+1|tJk,t+1 (2.31)
The value of a ”vacancy posting for capital” takes into account the cost of the
vacancy posting, ck which is compensated by the probability of success resulting
in a match that gives the reward of future marginal revenue stream from the
investment net off the payment of capital rental, rk,t.
V fk,t = −ck + qk(θkt )EtΛt+1|tJk,t+1 + (1− qk(θkt ))EtΛt+1|tV fk,t+1 (2.32)
Free Entry Condition for Investment The assumption of free entry condi-
tion results in the following
V fk,t ≤ 0 (2.33)
Equation (2.33) holds in equality if vacancies for capital investment, Vk,t > 0.
Equation (2.33) holding in equality implies
EtΛt+1|tJk,t+1 =
ck
qk(θk,t)
(2.34)
ck
qk(θk,t)
= EtΛt+1|t{αAt+1Kα−1t+1 N1−αt+1 − rk,t+1 + (1− δk)(1− se)
ck
qk(θk,t+1)
} (2.35)
Capital compensation The determination of compensation embodied in rk,t
is similar to the previous section. With ηk as the bargaining strength of the
households, rk,t is determined as
rk,t = argmax
rk,t
(V ek,t − V uk,t)ηk(Jk,t − V fk,t)1−ηk (2.36)
The derivation of the rk,t makes use of equations (2.36), (2.29), (2.30), (2.31),
(2.32), (2.34) and the FOC equations (2.9) and (2.10). The outcome of the Nash
bargaining is characterized as follows:
(1− ηk)Sk,t = Jk,t (2.37)
rk,t = ηk{αAtKα−1t N1−αt +(1−δk)(1−se)ckθk,t}+(1−ηk)(1−ψ)(1−δk)se (2.38)
In equation (2.38), the rental of capital, rk,t increases with both productivity and
market tightness which are driven by firm’s demand. It also increases with the
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deadweight loss (1 − ψ) from reallocation cost which empirically is acyclical and
provides a countervailing force to the cyclical effect from market tightness and
productivity effect. As my focus is not on reallocation effects and cost, I held
these as constant.
2.5 Labor Search Decision
The labor participation decision is determined by marginal disutility from search
activity and the rewards from the search activity in the form of the probability of
a successful match. The FOC equation is given as:
ν ′u(U
o
t ) = fn(θn,t)S
w
t Uc(Ct, Nt, U
o
t ) (2.39)
The labor force participation rate is given as follows:
Ft = Nt + Ut (2.40)
I use a simple formulation for the utility functions, νu(U
o
t ) and νn(Nt):
νu(U
o
t ) =
χu(U
o
t )
1+φu
1 + φu
(2.41)
νn(Nt) =
χ(Nt)
1+φn
1 + φn
(2.42)
2.6 Closing the model
Market clearing conditions for goods market gives:
Ct + ckvk,t + cnvn,t + Ca,nq(θn,t)vn,t + Invt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (2.43)
2.7 Calibration
Household I set the discount factor, β to 0.99 to reflect the annual interest rate
of 4%. For household preferences, I set σ = 1 which is represents an intertemporal
elasticicy of substitution of 1.
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Labor market The steady state job finding rate is set to 0.7 as the standard
setting for steady state quarterly job finding rate (see Blanchard and Gali (2010)).
Drawing upon the works of Hagedorn and Manovski(2008) and earlier evidence
by Silva and Toledo (2009), I take the average cost of hiring a worker to be 4%
of the quarterly wage ie cn
qn(θn)
= 0.04W¯ in steady state. The elasticity of the
matching function to unemployment, µn is set to be 0.5 is in line with calibration
in the literature as according to Petrongolo and Pissarides(2005) and argued by
Nagypal and Mortensen(2007). I set the wage bargain share for workers, ηn = 0.5
as implied by the Hosios condition. The replacement rate for the US is between
0.4 x steady state wage rate i.e. W¯ as argued by Nagypal and Mortensen (2007).
I apportion it reflecting both UI and social welfare at 0.1 W¯ and the remaining
0.3 to fixed costs of work. The steadystate level of disutility to work ψNφn is
set to 0.5 of marginal product of labor along the line suggested Nagypal and
Mortensen(2007) and Hall(2003). The implied adjustment cost from the steady
state conditions implosed on the model is 0.325W¯ which is in line with empirical
studies on adaptation costs and training costs for labor (see Sakellaris(2000)).
I set the steady state unemployment rate to 5% in line with the long run unem-
ployment rate of the US economy (see Gali (2010)). I set exogenous separation of
job matches to 12% as in Blanchard and Gali (2010) which draws upon the works
of Hall (1995) and Davis et al (1996). The steady state labor force participation
rate is targetted at 0.63.
Firms I set the persistence of aggregate technology shocks, ρa as 0.975 and
standard deviation, σa as 0.0072(King and Rebelo, 1999). I set α to 1/3 such that
1− α reflects the labor share of income.
Physical Capital Market I draw upon the works of Ramey and Shapiro
(1999) which reported that 71% of capital separation consists of retirements with
the remaining from exits or sales. Depreciation of capital stock is calibrated in
line with RBC literature targets of 0.025 quarterly or the equivalent of 10% per
annum. The exogenous separation rate of capital matches is then calibrated as
0.01. The steady state capital matching rate, I target fk(θk) at 0.5 which is in line
with long run average of sales to inventory for finished durable goods. The capital
matching rates for different capital goods range from very liquid machineries and
capital goods at 0.86 to very illiquid of 0.2 for plant and building. In Kurmann
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and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007), the authors targeted the midpoint of 0.5 which also
corresponds to the long run average of sales to inventory for finished durable
goods. I set the search cost ck/qk(θk) to be 0.59 of the rental rate as implied by
the steady state equations for the rest of the calibration with quarterly steady state
return on capital of 3.7%. This represents a search cost of less than 2 months of
rental costs. I set the bargaining strength of the households, ηk to be 0.7 and the
elasticity of match to liquid capital on the search market, µk to be 0.7 in line with
the estimated value in Ottonello (2015) of 0.8 and the calibration in Kurmann
and Petrosky-Nadeau(2007) of 0.5. The bargain strength is set to imply Hosios
conditions given the lack of empirical evidence.
2.8 Loglinearized Model
I present the loglinearized model and denote all small caps variable as the deviation
of log variable from its steady state ie k = logKt − logK¯. There are variables like
λ for which there is no small caps, the representation λˆ then represent the same
deviation of log of the variable from its steady state log value.
Capital transition equation (2.3)
k = (1− δk)(1− se)k(−1) + (1− (1− δk)(1− se)){(1− µk)θk + l} (2.44)
Liquid asset transition equation (2.4)
l = (1− f¯k)(1− δk)l(−1)− f¯k(1− δk)(1− µk)θk + inv( ¯Inv/L¯)
+ ψ(1− δk)se(K¯/L¯)k(−1) (2.45)
Labor transition equation (2.14)
n = (1− δn)n(−1) + (1− (1− δn)){(1− µn)θn + uo} (2.46)
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Household investment optimization (2.9) and (2.10)
0 = Etβ(1− f¯k)(1− δk){m−m(+1)− f¯k/(1− f¯k)(1− µk)θk}
+ (1− β(1− f¯k)(1− δk)){(1− µk)θk + λˆ(+1)} (2.47)
λˆ = Et(m−m(+1)) + Etβ(r¯k/λ¯)rk(+1) + β(1− δk)(1− se)Etλˆ(+1) (2.48)
Aggregate Productivity Shock equation (2.58)
a = ρaa(−1) + ea (2.49)
Equilibrium Wage equation (2.25)
w = ηn(1− α) Y
WN
(a+ αk(−1)− αn)
+ (1− ηn)χN
φn
W
φnn (2.50)
Free entry condition for labor match
µnθn = (1− α) q¯nY
cnN
(a+ αk(−1)− αn)− W
cn/ ¯(qn)
w
+ (1− δn)β{µnθn(+1)− (m(+1)−m)} (2.51)
Equilibrium capital rental rate
rk = ηkαY/r¯kK(a+ (α− 1)k(−1) + (1− α)n) + ηk(1− δk)(1− se)ckθ¯k/r¯kθk
(2.52)
Free entry condition for capital matches
µkθk = Et{−σ(c(+1)− c) + βα q¯kY
ckK
(a(+1) + (α− 1)k + (1− α)n(+1))
− β r¯k
ck/ ¯(qk)
rk(+1) + (1− δk)(1− se)βµkθk(+1)} (2.53)
Goods Market Clearing equation (2.43)
C/Y c+ ( ¯Inv/Y )inv + (ckVk/Y )vk + (CaH¯/Y )h+ (cnVn/Y )vn
= a+ αk(−1) + (1− α)n (2.54)
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Discount factor m
m = −σ(C¯c− χN
1+φn
(1 + φn)
(1 + φn)n)/M¯ (2.55)
Labor force participation equation
f = N/Fn+ U/Fu (2.56)
FOC for labor search
φuu
o = (1−mun)θn + cn
q(θn)
/(
cn
q(θn)
+ Ca)µnθn +m (2.57)
2.9 Evaluation of Model Performance
In this section, I examine the central prediction of the model of the artificial
economy in particular the standard deviations of key variables with the empirical
behavior of the US economy and the behavior of a standard RBC model. Table
2.1 shows the standard deviations of the key variables while Table 2.2 shows the
correlation between the variables.
Standard Deviations Data Benchmark RBC Model Frictional
Model
Output 1.62 1.17 1.52
Consumption 0.94 0.53 0.85
Employment rate,N 1.52 0.34 0.92
Investment 4.39 3.12 2.52
Inventory to sales 0.89 - 0.83
Labor force part. 0.48 - 0.6
Table 2.1: Performance of Key Variables
The model shows strong volatility in the labor market. The labor market volatility
results in a more volatile consumption, output and labor that is more in line with
the empirical data than the RBC model. However, the performance of the model
for investment is worse in spite of the availability of unused and unmatched capital
available. The lack of an amplification effect of the unused capital has also been
reported in Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) and Ottonello (2015). The
model also shows a sales to inventory ratio volatility for capital goods that is
Chapter 2 57
Correlations (to Output) Data Frictional
Model
Consumption 0.69 0.98
Employment(N) 0.87 0.98
Investment 0.87 0.98
Inventory to sales ratio(Capital) -0.70 -0.97
Labor force part. 0.3 0.8
Table 2.2: Correlations of Aggregate Variables and Y
Standard Deviations (σ(.)/σ( Y
N
) Data Frictional
Model
Real Wage 0.67 0.89
Unemployment 6.9 11.95
Vacancy 8.27 15.23
Tightness 14.96 13.3
Job Finding Rate 5.9 7.9
Table 2.3: Labor Market Characteristics
u v θn Job find. rate y/n
u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 -0.408
v - 1 0.975 0.897 0.364
θn - - 1 0.948 0.396
Job find. rate - - - 1 0.396
y/n - - - - 1
Table 2.4: Cross correlations - Quarterly US labor market - HKV(2007)
u v θn Job find. rate y/n
u 1 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -0.7
v - 1 0.99 0.99 0.62
θn - - 1 1 0.62
Job find. rate - - - 1 0.62
y/n - - - - 1
Table 2.5: Cross correlations - Benchmark model
in line with the empirical data on finished durable goods and structures. The
labor market volatility is achieved while reconciling the 2 key factors which are as
follows:
Wage Elasticity The wage elasticity to labor productivity from the benchmark
model is 0.98*0.89 = 0.87. The high wage elasticity differs from the wage rigidity
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strategy often used in literature to magnify the volatility of the labor market. This
is of interest in the context of Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens
(2013). In Pissarides (2009), Pissarides argued for the flexibility of wage for new
hires with the wage elasticity for new hires close to 1. Haefke, Sonntag and van
Rens (2013) estimated that the elasticity of wages to productivity should be close
to 1 and above 0.80.
Volatility and Procyclicality of the Disutility of Labor In the model, the
level of labor disutility that plays an important role in the wage formulation, is
set to 0.51 X marginal labor product. This is in line with the calibrations in the
literature based on estimates from Hall (2000) - (see Nagypal and Mortensen (2007)
and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016)). However, in the literature, the
labor disutility is also set to a constant level to increase the volatility of the
tightness of the labor market. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) argues
that the component of the opportunity cost of work that is not procyclical which is
the effective social security payout is only around 6% although it is countercyclical.
The disutility of labor on the other hand, is highly volatile and procyclical under
a power utility function formulation and it contributes to at least 50% of the
opportunity cost of labor. In the model here, the standard deviation of the labor
disutility is 1.4 X the standard deviation of the marginal labor product. It is also
highly procyclical with a correlation of 0.98 with Y. The model here still features a
fixed component for a fixed cost of employment that is calibrated at around 0.3 X
marginal labor product. This is along the line of calibration that Chodorow-Reich
and Karabarbounis (2016) used in the calibration for a Hagedorn and Manovski
model in their paper. Further, a sensitivity test is performed by lowering the fixed
cost to 0.2 X marginal labor product and raising the disutility of labor to 0.61.
The wage is now more volatile at 0.93 and u, v and θn are reduced but does not
change the results that a highly volatile labor market can be achieved even though
the opportunity cost of work is highly procyclical and volatile. The results are as
presented in Table 2.6:
Lack of amplification for investment The volatility of investment does not
increase with the amplification inspite of the amplification from employment. The
relative standard deviation with respect to output for investment spending by
the firms decreases to 1.68. The relative amount of investment goods that is
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Standard Deviations (σ(.)/σ( Y
N
) Data Frictional
Model
Real Wage 0.67 0.93
Unemployment 6.9 10.06
Vacancy 8.27 12.4
Tightness 14.96 11.89
Job Finding Rate 5.9 7.0
Table 2.6: Labor Market Char. : fixed cost = 0.2 marg. lab. prod.
produced(including unsold inventory) = 0.35/0.152 = 2.32. Both measures are
below the RBC model in relative terms. This is depite the model demonstrating
inventory behavior that is in line with empirical behavior of inventory to sales
ratio for durable consumption goods.
2.10 News Shocks and Pigou Cycles
In the sections that follow, I augment the productivity shocks with news shocks
about future technology shocks. This experimentation allows us to assess the im-
pact of the amplification mechanism of the model that comes from the availability
of the pool of unused resources for production when the current production is not
yet affected by the productivity improvements that only occurs in the future.
Definition of Pigou Cycle As defined in denHaan and Kaltenbrunner(2009),
in a Pigou Cycle, the economy expands in consumption, labor and capital in-
vestment in anticipation of an increase in future productivity. However in most
models, capital is modeled with a one period ahead install time and is therefore
predetermined. Likewise, if the model features one period ahead hiring, labor is
also predetermined. With these two constraints, either consumption or investment
goods can increase but not both as the production capacity is constrained. In ad-
dition, even with a model that features contemporaneous hiring and production
in the same period, the income effect on labor supply (see (Krusell and Mckay
(2010)) constrains the increase in labor employment in the economy and hence
the available output.
Beaudry and Portier (2014) reviews the difficulty in the modeling of a structural
RBC model in which consumption, employment and investment rise together in
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response to news about future shocks. Christiano et al (2008) demonstrates a RBC
model with internal habit formation, investment adjustment costs and variable
capital utilization. In that model, consumption, employment and investment rises
marginally. To create a boom-bust scenario, the authors augmented the model
with price rigidity and an accomodative monetary policy so that the effect is
magnified.
The model evaluation which is performed here is similar to the exercise done in
denHaan and Kaltenbrunner (2009). denHaan and Kaltenbrunner(2009) modeled
an RBC model with contemporaneous hiring, endogenous labor force participation
and new capital investment with each new job match as well as capital adjustment
in the existing matches with news shocks. However, as reported by the authors, the
model can only generate Pigou Cycle on a narrow range of values for the calibration
of the intertemporal elasticity of substituion and furthermore the range is below
2, which is generally outside the normal range of calibration in the literature.
News Shocks To study news shocks, the model is modified for both surprise
and news shocks to aggregate productivity, At, such that the evolution of aggregate
productivity is as follows:
log(At) = ρa log(At−1) + ea,t + en,t−4 (2.58)
News shock is represented by en,t−4 which represents an expectation shock occur-
ring in period 0 about a future shock that occurs in period 4. The characteristics
of en,t−4 is the same as ea,t i.e. IID normal with σ(en,t) = 0.0075 and mean 0.
2.11 Results - News Shocks
The impulse response functions of the benchmark model in response to surprise
shocks are as shown in Figures 2.1 panels 1 to 3 while the impulse response to
the expected shock are documented in Figures 2.2 panels 1 and 2. As shown in
Figure 2.2, the calibrated model is not able to generate an increase in investment
expenditure by firms except in the period before the shock and it is not signifi-
cant. The consumption smoothing effect results in the increase in consumption at
the expense of investment spending by the households. Inventory also decreases
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because less investment goods are produced. This is despite the increase in labor
matches created.
Alternate Calibrations The model is re-calibrated in an exercise to investi-
gate the directions in which the model performance could be augmented. I conduct
the same experimentation as in denHaan and Kaltibrunner (2009). I increase the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in steps from 1.0 to 2.0 and additionally
targetted the steady state household’s matching rate of the capital market from
0.5 to 0.3.
The re-calibrations for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are along the
same line as the calibration exercise in denHaan and Kaltibrunner (2009). The
calibration values are not standard calibration values in macroeconomic models.
However, Thimme (2017)’s survey of the calibrations for the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution suggests that the calibration values for IES (intertemporal
elasticity of substitution) between 1.5 and 2 are plausible values especially in het-
erogeneous settings where wealth and capital holdings are concentrated in a small
section of the population. In micro-studies, the estimation of IES of 2.5 or above
2 have been proposed taking into account of the limited particpation of stockhold-
ings (see Attanasio (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)).
Our second recalibration exercise is to target the sales to stock ratio of capital
goods. While the long run sales to stock ratio for durable final goods implies a
finding rate of 0.5, the long run sales to stock ratio for structures, plants and fixed
assets is around 0.4. A calibration exercise towards values ranging from 0.4 to
0.3 would be consistent with structures and fixed assets equipment that are less
”liquid”, take for example aircrafts and plant machineries.
I present the impulse response functions for the calibrations of (Fk, σ) of (0.5,0.6),(0.4,0.7)
and (0.3,0.8). These calibrations results in positive growth in consumption, invest-
ment, output and labor. I will discuss the analysis in the next section. The re-
ported response functions are not singular readings but sample readings in a range
of calibration values. A calibration target of Fk of 0.5 results in a very narrow
range of 0.55< σ <0.6 that can generate Pigou Cycles. The table of calibrations
for Fk and σ that can generate Pigou Cycles is given in Table 2.1:
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Fk σ lower value σ higher value
0.5 0.55 0.6
0.4 0.6 0.7
0.3 0.65 0.9
Table 2.1: Calibrations Generating Pigou Cycles - in steps of 0.05
2.11.1 Discussions
While the calibrations show that there are plausible values that can generate Pigou
Cycles, we note that the magnitude of investment expenditures generated are not
nearly as strong even with an IES that is calibrated above 1. This has to do with
the lack of amplification from a physical matching market. While the labor market
is volatile and supplies the amplification needed to drive the needed production to
support the consumption growth, the capital market movement is quite restricted.
Another finding is that with lower calibrated sales to stock ratio representing more
illiquidity in the physical capital market, the range for IES increases and extends
closer to 1, the standard calibration for IES.
2.12 Conclusions
The model could be best described in two parts. First a frictional model incor-
porating frictional labor and physical capital markets is developed. The issue of
a labor market lacking in volatility is eliminated by the incorporation of a sunk
fixed costs for labor match formation and an endogenous labor supply so that
the outside option feedback mechanism from the labor market is eliminated. The
outcome is that a wage that is highly elastic and the opportunity cost of work that
is highly volatile and procyclical are both left intact while the responsiveness of
the labor market to shocks is greatly augmented. The capital market exhibits the
same issues as in the generic model of the labor market and this is exhibited in the
low responsiveness of investment to shocks. However the inventory characteristics
are in line with the literature on inventories of durable goods. This area could be
an area of future investigation.
The model is put through a test with news shock. It achieves the objective of
generating Pigou Cycle features with a higher calibration value for the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution and a physical capital market with a lower liquidity
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that is more consistent with that of structures and fixed assets. However, the
main mechanism is through the increase in responsiveness of the labor market.
The matching frictions in the physical capital market only serves a secondary
channel in offsetting the decline in the production of investment goods which is
channeled away into consumption goods. Future research can proceed along the
line of amplification mechanisms on capital investment. Given the installation
lead time for capital featured in the model, it is likely that the magnification will
come from capital work week adjustment or variable capital utilization that has
been studied quite extensively. Several additional approaches can also be applied
and has been demonstrated in works by Christiano et al (2010) and denHaan and
Lozej(2010). The earlier paper features nominal price rigidity and accomodative
monetary policies to magnify the Pigou Cycle effects. These mechanisms should
be seen as complementary and not competing explanations.
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(a) Consumption (b) Tech. Shock, a
(c) Y (d) N
Figure 2.1: Panel 1 -Impulse Resp. to Unanticipated Tech. Shock
(e) U (f) θn
(g) Wage (h) Job Finding Rate
Figure 2.1: Continued Panel 2 - Impulse Resp. to Unanticipated Tech. Shock
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(i) Investment Expenditure (j) Investment Goods Produced
(k) Stock to Sales Ratio (l) Inventory
Figure 2.1: Continued Panel 3 -Impulse Resp. to Unanticipated Tech. Shock
(a) Consumption (b) N
(c) Y (d) Invest. Expenditure
Figure 2.2: Panel 1 -Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock in Period 5-
Benchmark Model
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(e) Jk-Value of Capital to Firms (f) Invest. Goods Produced
(g) Inventory of Unmatched Capi-
tal
Figure 2.2: Continued Panel 2 - Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock -
Benchmark Model
(a) Consumption (b) N
(c) Y (d) Invest. Expenditure
Figure 2.3: Panel 1 -Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock σ = 0.8
Fk = 0.3
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(e) Jk-Value of Capital to Firms (f) Invest. Goods Produced
(g) Inventory of Unmatched Capi-
tal
Figure 2.3: Continued Panel 2 - Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech Shock-
σ = 0.8 Fk = 0.3
(a) Consumption (b) N
(c) Y (d) Invest. Expenditure
Figure 2.4: Panel 1 -Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock- σ = 0.7
Fk = 0.4
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(e) Jk-Value of Capital to Firms (f) Invest. Goods Produced
(g) Inventory of Unmatched Capi-
tal
Figure 2.4: Continued Panel 2 - Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock-
σ = 0.7 Fk = 0.4
(a) Consumption (b) N
(c) Y (d) Invest. Expenditure
Figure 2.5: Panel 1 -Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech Shock- σ = 0.6
Fk = 0.5
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(e) Jk-Value of Capital to Firms (f) Invest. Goods Produced
(g) Inventory of Unmatched Capi-
tal
Figure 2.5: Continued Panel 2 - Impulse Resp. to Anticipated Tech. Shock-
σ = 0.6 Fk = 0.5
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